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Abstract
There are many different approaches for settling dis-
putes on-line, such as simple email systems, fixed bid
systems and intelligent systems. However, to date
there have been no attempts to integrate decision sup-
port methods into the dispute resolution process for
the purpose of supporting outcomes that are consis-
tent with judicial reasoning.
This paper describes how a model of judicial rea-
soning can be used to assist divorcees with the reso-
lution of property issues online, in a manner that is
consistent with decisions a judge would make if the
matter was heard in Court. The approach uses an
argument based model of the discretionary nature of
decisions made by judges in Australian Family Law.
This is integrated with a protocol for online dispute
dialogue. Predictions of the likelihood of alternates
outcomes is achieved with a series of Bayesian Belief
Networks.
Keywords: Argument Theory, Decision Support, Just
Decisions, On-Line Dispute Resolution, Family Law
1 Introduction
There are many different approaches for settling dis-
putes on-line, such as simple email systems, fixed bid
systems and intelligent systems (Tyler, Bretherton &
Firth 2003). The majority of these systems use nego-
tiation, mediation or arbitration as the mechanisms
with which to resolve disputes(Bonnet, Boudaoud,
Gagnebin, Harms & Schultz 2002). In cases involving
e-commerce, Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is of-
ten preferred to litigation because it is less expensive
and avoids jurisdictional issues across international
borders. (Bonnet et al. 2002).
Family-Winner (Zeleznikow & Bellucci 2003, Bel-
lucci & Zeleznikow 2005) provides useful support for
disputes that take place in family law concerning cus-
tody or property issues following a divorce. It is a
sophisticated negotiation system which ensures that
the users receve a fair negotiation, however what the
system is incapable of is distributing the assets in
proportion to what is just and equitable for each of
the disputants. Thus any agreement reached has a
high probability that it will be seen as unjust. Sim-
ilar problems arise with other attempts at legal dis-
pute resolution systems such as DEUS(Zeleznikow &
Bellucci 2003).
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Unlike disputes that occur in commercial settings,
in family law there is a greater need for outcomes
to be consistent with decisions a Family Court judge
would hand down if the dispute was litigated. Ne-
gotiating parties in family law disputes are often
not equal in bargaining position and, according to
(Alexander 1992), sometimes one party will accept a
less than just agreement in order to end the conflict,
particularly in marriages where spousal abuse has oc-
curred.
An ODR approach will be advanced in this paper
that tightly couples a prediction of judicial outcomes
into the dispute resolution process. However, due to
the discretionary nature of Australian Family Law,
determining what a judge sees as a fair decision is
not a trivial task. The main statute, the Family Law
Act of Australia, provides a judge with a list of rele-
vant factors to consider, such as the the age of both
parties and the paramount interests of the child - but
the statute is silent on their relative weightings. This
issue of representing reasoning in discretionary legal
domains is not new and although there has been a
great deal of discussion from a legal theoretic per-
spective there has been less discussion about the ap-
propriate ways to represent knowledge for a model of
discretionary reasoning.
Dowrkin(1977) identified three basic types of dis-
cretion that exemplified different conclusions inferred
in different ways: two types of weak discretion and
a type he characterized as strong. Strong discretion
characterizes that reasoning which involves the lib-
erty, on the part of the reasoner, to incorporate stan-
dards of his or her own choosing. To use his example,
an Army sergeant required to select five men exercises
strong discretion because no constraints are supplied
to guide the decision. Dworkin proposes that this
is the nature of the position of the judge in a sit-
uation where usual standards or rules do not apply.
Weak discretion of type one exists when one’s decision
is bound by rules that may inherently have variable
interpretations, but nevertheless, those rules apply.
The Sergeant required to select five experienced men
exercises Type 1 discretion because the decision in-
volves interpreting the standard of experienced. The
second type of weak discretion exists when a decision
is made according to applicable rules and standards
but the decision maker’s decision stands as final and
cannot be appealed. A decision made by an umpire
during a football match exemplifies Type 2 discretion.
Although Mc Cormack(1981) suggested discretion
is more a continuum rather than distinct categories
as proposed by Dworkin, the basic tenent still main-
tained was that discretion involved the liberty to infer
conclusions in various ways. Christie (1986) claimed
that the exercise of discretion involves power relation-
ships within a political system but shares the view
with Bayles (1990) that discretion involves the abil-
ity to reason toward one of a number of possible con-
clusions.
Knowledge representation schemes that have been
used to model discretionary reasoning include the lay-
out of arguments advanced by Toulmin (1969) . The
Toulmin structure has been extended by (Yearwood
& Stranieri 2006) in their Generic Actual Argument
Model(GAAM). DiaLaw Lodder(1999)(Lodder 1999)
uses a combination of dialogue and argumentation
ideas to represent a legal argument. Other approaches
have been used such as hybrid Fuzzy Logic/Neural
Networks (Hollatz 1999, Philipps & Sartor 1999) and
Bayesian Belief Networks (Davis & Pei 2003, Halli-
well, Keppens & Shen 2003).
A model that combines a Generic Actual Argu-
ment Model with a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN)
will be advanced in this paper. It will be argued that
in order to model discretionary reasoning in family
law sufficiently well to make predictions and achieve
just outcomes in an ODR system, the use of the
GAAM or BBN alone will not suffice. Instead a com-
bination of the two is better suited to the task. The
next two sections will discuss the GAAM and the
BBN respectively in the context of discretionary rea-
soning. Following this there will be a description of
how the two representations can be combined. This
will be followed by a sample consultation, to highlight
how the proposed model works in an ODR environ-
ment.
2 Generic Actual Argument Model
The Generic Actual Argument Model (GAAM)
(Yearwood & Stranieri 2006, Stranieri, Yearwood &
Zeleznikow 2002) is a structure for capturing expert
reasoning. The approach is based on the argument
structure proposed by Toulmin (1969). The Toulmin
Argument Structure (TAS) Fig 1 was proposed as an
alternative to the traditional approach proposed by
Aristotle of ’minor premise; major premise; so con-
clusion’. An example of this is ’Socrates is a man; All
men are mortal; so Socrates is a mortal’. Toulmin
argued that although the Aristotle approach to argu-
ments was suited to analytical argument it is inade-
quate for uses with other types of arguments. Take
for example an argument that involves uncertainty,
’Mustafa is an Arab; Most Arabs are Muslims; So
Mustafa is most likely a Muslim’. Under Aristotle’s
argumentation approach this type of argument would
be dismissed because the link between the premise
and conclusion is uncertain. The TAS on the other
hand acknowledges that these types of arguments are
commonplace and arguments that involve uncertainty
are still valid.
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Figure 1: Toulmin Argument Structure, Family Law
example
The TAS consists of six parts which each relate to
different components of a well formed argument. In
Fig 1 these are:
Claim: The claim being advanced. e.g The wife is
entitled to the family home.
Modality: The extent to which the claimant believes
in the claim they are advancing. e.g highly likely
Data: One or more data items that support the
claim. e.g Wife has primary care of the children.
Warrant: For each data item a reason why that data
item is relevant to the argument. e.g It is in the
best interests of the children to not remove them
from the family home.
Backing: For each warrant there may be a backing
to strengthen the warrant and justify it’s rele-
vance. e.g Past verdicts from judges.
Rebuttal: An argument against the advanced claim
or a condition under which the claim becomes
invalid. e.g Unless the children are under 18.
.
The argument made in Fig 1 would read: The wife
believes that she has a strong claim to the family
home. This is because she has custody of the two
children from the marriage and she is able to cite
precedents from past cases that dictate that the lives
of children under 18 should be disrupted as minimally
as possible. The data item, that she has primary care
of the children, is a claim of another argument that
itself has a data item, warrant, modality and backing.
The Generic Actual Argument Model is an adapta-
tion of the TAS. One difference involves the replace-
ment of the warrant in the Toulmin structure with
two components; a reason for the relevance of each
data item and an inference mechanism that acts as
a procedure to infer the claim from the data items.
Fig 2 represents part of a generic argument involved
in selecting the five experienced patrolmen. In this
case the assertion made is that patrolmen A, B, C, D
and E are the five selected. This claim is made on the
basis of data. The two data items are the pool of pa-
trolmen and the years of service for each patrolman.
The reason that the first data item is relevant derives
from the Captains orders. The reason that years of
service is relevant is that this is the standard for ex-
perience that the Sergeant has chosen. The inference
mechanism is a function that ranks patrolmen using
the standard.
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Figure 2: Argument structure for Dworkin’s patrol-
men
Three ways a decision maker exercises discretion
can be discerned from the representation in 2.
• The decision maker has discretion to add (or re-
move) data item factors
• The decision maker has discretion to use an infer-
ence procedure of his/her own choosing to infer
a claim value from data item values
• The decision maker has the discretion to leave
data items, reasons for relevance, inference pro-
cedure, and reasons for the appropriateness of
inference procedures implicit.
The GAAM also differs from the TAS by utiliz-
ing a variable/value representation of claims. Fig 3
illustrates a generic argument that models the claims
the wife is entitled to the family home and is not
entitled to the family home. An actual argument is
an instance of the generic template. Fig 3 illustrates
an actual argument that infers the wife is entitled to
the family home. This claim is made using a set of
rules known as myRules on claims that the wife has
primary care and moving will have enormous adverse
effects
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Figure 3: GAAM Family Law example
In Fig 3 an additional difference involves the omis-
sion of the rebuttal component of the TAS and the ad-
dition of two new items: Inference Mechanism Vari-
able and Inference Mechanism Value described below:
Claim Variable(Claim): The current claim being
advanced.
Claim Value: These are different values, one of
which will be used to change the claim.
Inference Mechanism Variable: The current in-
ference mechanism being used. This is used to
combine all the Data Variables and Data Values
for a claim in order to make a prediction as to
what the the claim Value should be.
Inference Mechanism Value: A list of the avail-
able inference mechanisms.
Data Variable (Data): These are subarguments
or factors that are relevant in support-
ing/determining the claim.
Data Value: These are different values, one of which
will be used to change the corresponding data
Variable.
Data Relevance Reason (Warrant): This is the
reason why the corresponding data Variable is
relevant to the claim.
Data Relevance Backing (Relevance): This is
some form of backing for the corresponding Data
Relevance Reason.
.
(Stranieri & Zeleznikow 2005) described the use
of the GAAM for modeling reasoning in family law
property proceedings in their Split-Up system. The
GAAM uses a tree structure known as an argument
tree. The argument tree extracts the claim and
data items from a series of interconnected arguments,
where each argument takes the form described in Fig
3. Each level of the tree represents a subargument or
factor of the higher level. A segment of the Split-Up
Family Law tree is provided in Fig 4 which illustrates
the tree structure. Claim values, inference mecha-
nisms and reasons for relevance are not included in
Fig 4.
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Figure 4: Section of the Split-Up Argument tree.
(Stranieri et al. 2002)
The top of the tree is the root node, which rep-
resents the argument of division of marital assets.
Under the root node are the three most important
arguments in determining the division of marital as-
sets. These arguments were elicited from past cases
and legislation by family law experts. These nodes
are children of the root node. Below each of the three
arguments are the important subarguments and so
on. For instance, a judge working out the length of
a marriage will consider the number of years of mar-
riage, time apart during cohabitation and the number
of years of cohabitation prior to marriage. A judge
will combine these factors in order to reach, what he
or she believes to be a judgement about the length of
a marriage.
In total, 93 factors were identified by Stranieri &
Zelenzikow (2005) as being relevant by family law
experts. These were structured as an argument tree
that can be used to infer a percentage split of prop-
erty at the root node. For a factor to be relevant,
family law experts involved in the knowledge acquisi-
tion must articulate a reason for its relevance. Skabar
(1997) demonstrated that a subset of 17 of these fac-
tors could be discovered to yield predictions as accu-
rate as those obtained using the entire set. However,
notwithstanding this, the full 93 were insisted upon
by experts as necessary for inclusion in order to of-
fer a more complete explanation of the reasoning. To
take an extreme example of this, one can imagine a
magic dice that correctly infers judicial outcomes yet
is clearly inadequate for explaining a decision.
Stranieri & Zelenzikow (2005) trained neural net-
works by gathering data from past cases heard in the
Family Court. The data was used to train a network
at each level of the argument tree. Split-Up predicted
court outcomes by prompting the user for leaf node
values and running inferences up the tree until a claim
value at the root node was inferred. This approach is
limited to the prediction of a judge’s decision given
one set of facts; those of the party setting the leaf
node values. However, the approach is not satisfac-
tory in an ODR context because both parties must
weigh up the strength with which they hold their be-
liefs against the likelihood that a judge will not agree
with their claims. What is required is an approach
that can propagate certainty values forward from leaf
node to root node for each party. In the next sec-
tion Bayesian Belief Networks are deployed for this
purpose.
3 Bayesian Belief Networks
A Bayesian Belief Network(BBN) is a directed graph
where nodes represent factors of a domain problem.
Nodes are linked with directional arcs which represent
the dependencies of which one node relies on another
in order to make uncertainty predictions.
Fig 5 & Table 3 illustrates a BBN for calculating
the length of a marriage. A husband or wife assert
their claim for a share of the property following di-
vorce. A judge’s decision about the length of a mar-
riage(Lm) is made on the basis of three factors; the
number of years the parties have been married(Ym),
the length of cohabitation prior to the marriage(Cl),
if any, and the duration of any time apart during the
marriage or cohabitation(Ta).
Ml
Cl
Ta
Ym
Figure 5: Bayesian network for marriage length
Node Values
Ml Marriage length {very long, long, short,very short}
Cl Prior Cohab Length {very long, long, short,very short}
Ta Time apart {great deal, some,none}
Ym Years married {0-5,6-10,11-15,16-20,21-25, over 25}
Table 1: Values for Marriage length
Table 3 depicts the belief the husband holds about
the length of the cohabitation prior to the marriage.
He is 90% certain the prior cohabitation was long
but accepts there is a smaller chance that it could be
seen as very long. Table 3 illustrates the husband’s
certainty that the marriage was between 16 and 20
years of length. The husband is also certain there was
no time apart during the marriage or cohabitation
though this is not illustrated below. The conditional
probability provided below utilizes the prior proba-
bility in the calculation for each marriage length out-
come given the antecedent factors. For example, the
prior probability that a marriage is very long given a
very long prior cohabitation, no time apart and 16 to
20 years marriage is 90%. Prior probabilities are cur-
rently estimated by family law experts but can con-
ceivably be drawn from databases of past decisions.
P (Ml|Cl, Ta, Y m)
The application of the Bayesian calculation using
the husband’s beliefs illustrated in Tables 3 & 3 in-
dicate the marriage length is likely to be regarded as
very long by a judge with a confidence of 72% and
long with a confidence of 28%. The probability that
a judge will regard the marriage as short or very short
is deemed to be 0%.
Cl P(Cl)
very long 0.1
long 0.9
short 0.0
very short 0.0
Table 2: Prior probabilities for Prior Cohab Length
Ym P(Ym)
0-5 0.0
6-10 0.0
11-15 0.0
16-20 1.0
21-25 0.0
over 25 0.0
Table 3: Prior probabilities for Yrs Married
Typically a Bayesian Belief Network is constructed
in consultation with domain experts who supply rel-
evant factors and estimate prior probabilities. In the
next section an approach that integrates Bayesian Be-
lief Networks into the GAAM is presented.
4 Combining GAAM with BBN
The Generic Actual Argument Model (GAAM) and
the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) are integrated for
the ODR approach advanced here. A justification of
the advantages of doing this are presented later in
this section. Before this is done, the way the two are
integrated is described. The GAAM is a structure for
modeling legal reasoning in an explicit manner that
can be justified. However the model does not specify
a procedure for performing inferences. In contrast,
the BBN is a method for calculating uncertainty that
is also capable of modeling reasoning.
The GAAM provides a structure for modeling a
dispute but not for calculating the strength of an
argument. In this work, a Bayesian Belief Network
(BBN) is embedded into each level of the argument
tree. Integrating the GAAM and the BBN is a rel-
atively simple task. In the GAAM an inference pro-
cedure is a mapping between child claim values and
parent claim values. A BBN is deployed to implement
a mapping. At each node of the argument tree where
sub nodes exist (example Fig 4) there needs to be a
BBN to infer the support (Fig 6). The BBN at each
of these points resembles the structure of the GAAM
at the same point; for instance in Fig 6 the node to be
inferred is the Relative Homemaker and the subnodes
that are to be used to make the inference are Rela-
tive household duties and Relative child rearing. This
structure is similar in both the GAAM and the BBN,
however rather than use a single BBN a number of
small BBNs are embedded into the GAAM. For ex-
ample in the Relative Homemaker are the three nodes
that make up the BBN - but they are only one part
of the GAAM. Though the BBNs used for inferring
are separate they share a link to each other through
the GAAM.
Fig 7 shows the relationship between the GAAM
nodes (Root, A, B, C and D) and the BBN nodes
(r, a, b1, b2, c and d). The Links that join GAAM
nodes C & D to their counter part BBN nodes c &
d represent the user’s argument claim being passed
from the GAAM to the BBN. Once the values have
been passed in to the BBN, the BBN is able to infer
the strength of each of the argument claims for node
b1, the results of which are passed to node B. There
the user is asked to consider the results and make a
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Figure 6: Subsection of the Split-Up Argument tree,
including claim values and Inference Belief Network.
selection.
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Figure 7: Relationship betwen GAAM and BBN
Both the GAAM and the BBN are tools for mod-
eling reasoning so why not use one or the other? Al-
though they have a common purpose, modeling rea-
soning, they both have attributes that are not found
in the other which can be combined beneficially. The
GAAM as illustrated earlier is a structure that is well
suited to the representation of domain/expert knowl-
edge, as is the BBN. However the GAAMs ability to
not only capture the reasoning but to go further and
provide the relevance for the reasoning is lacking in
the BBN. Though in some domains this is not overly
important it is extremely important in law, as was
explained by (Stranieri & Zeleznikow 2005).
The construction of BBN is based on a loosely
described protocol whereby an expert’s reasoning is
mapped out through linking relevant factors. There
is no real standard to how factors should relate and
it is conceivable that two, or more, different BBNs
could be constructed for the same problem. This may
or may not affect the inference process, yet domain
models constructed with the GAAM are constructed
in a particular manner. The linking of related factors
requires an expert to articulate a reason and relevance
for the link to be justified.
Further, the GAAM can act as a platform for un-
certain calculations other than BBN to be used. This
enables a greater flexibility when inferences need to
be made. It was illustrated earlier that the GAAM
by itself specifies no given inference mechanism. This
feature of the model allows the BBN to be used. How-
ever it is this same feature that allows other inference
mechanisms to be included. In this way the GAAM
acts as a bridge between different inference mecha-
nisms allowing the different uncertainties inferences
to combined.
To use the GAAM without the BBN would result
in inferred outcomes that would be of little use to
a disputant. On the other hand a useful model can
undoubtedly be derived from only using the BBN,
however without an explicit and justifiable structure
the results would be inadmissible in a legal domain.
In the next section a sample consultation is pro-
vided to illustrate the way the GAAM/BBN is a cen-
tral feature of an ODR approach that encourages de-
cisions that are similar to judicial outcomes.
5 Sample Consultation
The ODR protocol commences once the husband and
the wife independently and asynchronously access a
web site. They are each presented with the root of the
argument, Percentage split of assets(Fig 4) and asked
to assert a claim for this argument. The husband (H)
claims the split should be 80/20, (80% to H, 20% to
W) whereas the wife (W) claims that the split should
be in the order of 55/45. Behind the scenes the system
compares the claims and informs H and W that they
have a disagreement on how the property should be
split but does not divulge the respective claims. To
do so would be to invite combat and possibly inflate
anger.
In order to resolve the root node disagreement the
system now prompts H and W to examine and make
claims on the next layer of the argument. Both H and
W are now presented with those factors; the contribu-
tion of H relative to W, the relative needs of H to W
and the level of wealth in the marriage. H claims that
he contributed much more than W, that W’s needs
are more than his and the the level of wealth was av-
erage. W claims that H contributed more, that she
needs more than H and that the level of wealth was
average. Again the system compares the claims and
informs W and H that there is agreement on two of
the arguments but that there is disagreement on the
claim to the contributions.
Once again H and W are prompted with the sub-
arguments for the argument in dispute: the relative
negative contribution of H to W (negative contribu-
tions - exemplified by gambling losses - are those that
diminish marital resources), the relative main contri-
bution of H to W, the length of the marriage and the
relative home maker contribution of H to W. H claims
that: his negative contribution by way of gambling or
domestic violence was the same as W (i.e non exis-
tent), that he contributed much more than W and
that he contributed about the same as W toward the
homemaking role.
W though, unsure how to answer the first argu-
ment, elects to drill down to the children nodes and
have the system infer values for her negative contri-
butions. Now W is given the subarguments and is
asked to make claims for each. Where this is a non-
leaf argument then all that W would need to do is
make the claims as she has done for the other argu-
ments, but as this is a leaf argument this is not the
case. In addition to making a claim for each of the
arguments W is required to provide some sort of evi-
dence to support her claims. In this example W may
have financial records that show large sums of money
were withdrawn from a casino in addition to other
discrepancies.
Having done this, the system infers the results and
suggests to W, that based on her claims and the evi-
dence to support the claims: there is high support a
judge will see that H has made a more negative con-
tribution than her, there a low chance that it will be
seen that H has made a much more or average nega-
tive contribution and is not at all likely to see that H
has made the same, less or much less negative contri-
bution. In finding this, W decides to claim that H has
made a high negative contribution. W decides that
she does not need assistance in deciding claims for the
other arguments and claims that: H contributed more
than her, that the marriage was of average length and
she did contribute more to the home making.
The system once again compares the input fromW
and H and discovers that there are three arguments
that differ. H makes assertions for each of the sub-
arguments as he has done before and provides any
evidence for the leaf arguments that he encounters.
W also continues in this fashion, however the system
informs W that as she has already made claims for
the subargument of negative contributions that she
is not required to reconsider those claims. If W did
decide to reconsider her claims for negative contribu-
tion the system will prevent the user from making the
change unless they are prepared to submit claims for
the subarguments too. As the negative contribution
is a leaf node, W can change her claims and or the
evidence to support her claims.
Both W and H, having now explored the argu-
ments to the lowest level possible have only to decide
if they are happy with the claims suggested by the
system or if they would prefer to ignore the system’s
advice and select a different claim for each argument.
To give some incentive for W and H to accept the rec-
ommended claims the system provides a support for
each claim. The support is a calculation of the likeli-
hood a judge will agree with a particular claim based
on the evidence and claims made by both parties.
Using the support measure W and H independently
work their way back to the root argument where the
final recommendation is made, a 60/40 split.
6 Conclusion
An ODR approach was advanced that can incorporate
legal fairness. Though the approach can not guar-
antee 100% fairness, as doing this would move away
from ODR into the creation of a virtual judge, it does
place a greater emphasis on fairness, which has been
lacking in other ODR approches. By examining the
way in which a judge reasons and then using this ju-
dicial reasoning to structure the dispute, it is hoped
that the disputants gain an understanding of the dis-
pute from all positions. Through providing judicially
based advice to the disputants on their position, it is
believed that disputants will focus more on resolving
the dispute than on turning the dispute into a battle
of wills. The approach integrates an argumentation
based model of reasoning Generic Actual Argument
with a Bayesian Belief Network to implement infer-
ences with uncertainty. The prior probabilities derive
mainly from past judgements. The next stage in the
development of the model discussed in this paper is to
implement the ideas as an on-line system. Future re-
search aims to empirically validate the claim that this
approach enhances deliberative dialogue in an ODR
system.
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